Bankers' acceptances: yesterday's instrument to restart today's credit markets? by Richard G. Anderson
Economic SYNOPSES
short essays and reports on the economic issues of the day
2009 ￿ Number 5
I
t is generally agreed that the U.S. economy’s current
financial problems began with heightened uncertainty
regarding the quality of certain mortgage-backed securi-
ties. It is also generally agreed that these concerns were ampli-
fied by, and led to, a virtual collapse of the credit insurance
market when investors discovered that credit-default insurers
likely would be unable to perform on their guarantees. As a
result, financial market participants, fearful of exposure to
now-uninsurable counterparty risk, sharply reduced lending
to others. By this path, a crisis of confidence regarding the
solvency of counterparties became a liquidity crisis (Mizen,
2008). Timelines for these events are available from several
sources, including this Bank (www.stlouisfed.org).
Responses to these problems—at the Treasury, FDIC, and
the Federal Reserve—include (i) injecting capital into banks
to reduce the counterparty risk incurred when doing business
with them and to stimulate bank lending; (ii) guaranteeing
certain nonbank financial market transactions, including those
involving shares held by investors in money market mutual
funds, marketability of the assets held by money market
mutual funds, and interbank borrowing for terms of 30 days
or more; (iii) directly funding certain types of lending in finan-
cial markets by purchasing selected instruments, including
commercial paper, debt issued
by government-sponsored
enterprises such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, and
long-term Treasury securities.
Yet, one shortcoming of these
programs is apparent: Rather
than increasing credit flows
through private financial mar-
kets, these programs tend to
replace these flows with credit
intermediated by the federal
government. Could this be
changed? And, if existing fed-
eral programs eventually are
to be phased out, is there an
alternative program that might
both address counterparty-
risk concerns and provide an “exit strategy” as private market
participants regain confidence in their ability to assess and
price?
This note suggests considering an old—not new—financial
market instrument: bankers’ acceptances. Bankers’ acceptances
are one of the world’s older financial instruments, used as early
as the twelfth century. Bankers’ acceptances have a long history
in the Federal Reserve. The founders of the Federal Reserve,
wishing to establish an active bankers’ acceptance market in
New York City to compete with London, empowered the
Federal Reserve Banks (which have charters similar to national
banks) to participate in the bankers’ acceptance market. During
their early years, Reserve Banks actively rediscounted and pur-
chased eligible acceptances; during one period, some Reserve
Banks conducted open market policy solely in acceptances
(Meltzer, 2003, especially Chap. 4).
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Bank  What, exactly, are bankers’ acceptances and how do they
work? A “bankers’ acceptance” is a time draft, that is, an order
to pay a specified amount of money to the holder of the accep  -
tance on a specified date (Stigum, 1990). A bankers’ acceptance
is created when a bank agrees to “accept,” or guarantee, a future
payment between two firms. For example, suppose company B
wishes to buy a shipment of generic widgets, costing $1 million,
from company A. Company A wishes to be paid at the time
the widgets are shipped, but company B does not have on hand
the $1 million required. The principal economic concept in
this essay is that financing via bankers’ acceptances reduces
the counterparty risk that arises when these firms are unable
to accurately measure and/or insure the risk of doing business
with each other: If company B pays in advance, what is the risk
that company A will not ship the widgets? And, if company A
ships the widgets before receiving payment, what is the risk
that company B will not pay? 
In an acceptance transaction, company B would go to its
bank, request a letter of credit payable to company A, and send
the letter of credit to company A. When company A ships the
widgets, it would take the letter to its bank; after company A’s
bank has assured itself that company A has in fact shipped the
widgets, it would request $1 million from company B’s bank.
To reduce its risk, company B’s bank likely would require title
to the widgets as collateral for the funds paid on company B’s
behalf. Company B’s bank, next, must choose whether to
record the $1 million sent to company A’s bank as a loan to
company B or to “accept” and sell to a third-party investor
the promise by company B to pay $1 million at the specified
future date; if the latter, a bankers’ acceptance is created. The
acceptance is a combination of two parts: company B’s obliga-
tion to pay its bank $1 million at a specific future date (a com-
mitment that the bank sells to an investor), plus the promise
by company B’s bank to pay the investor if company B does
not. If company B fails to pay, the bank is obliged to pay
because it has “accepted” responsibility for timely payment
(see chart). The bank’s decision to record the $1 million as a
loan or to create an acceptance is often complex, involving
projections of anticipated future lending opportunities, the
cost and availability of lendable funds, the willingness of cus-
tomers to pay fees, and the bank’s level of capital.
Flexibility is an advantage of acceptance financing: The
trading firms need not assess the integrity of each other, and
the various parties to the transaction might be located in dif-
ferent countries. Although acceptance financing is not a risk-
free endeavor, the risk is borne largely by the accepting bank.
The accepting bank incurs risk when advancing funds to com-
pany B—but it is the business of banks to assess and monitor
risk. (Traditionally, because of the distances involved, accep  -
tances were popular for international trade, but the same prin-
ciples apply to domestic transactions.) Bankers’ acceptance
financing, however, may be costly. More than one bank may
be involved, and specialists are required to create the accep  -
tance documents, verify the shipment and receipt of goods,
and prevent the diversion of the goods before repayment. In
recent years, other financial market instruments have tended
to offer business financing with lower transaction costs, at
least when counterparty risk can be well measured and/or
insured via third-parties.
Bankers’ acceptances are an old idea whose time may have
returned—but with central banks acting in the role of the
accepting bank. Historically, commercial banks created bankers’
acceptances and, in certain circumstances, the holders of these
acceptances (including banks, security dealers, and nonfinan-
cial firms) would rediscount the acceptances to the Federal
Reserve. It seems a worthwhile idea to explore whether these
roles might be reversed, with Federal Reserve Banks “accepting”
and thereafter selling the acceptance to investors. For example,
depository institutions currently hold more than $640 billion
in excess reserve deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks, while
the Federal Reserve is lending funds to special-purpose vehicles
that purchase a variety of assets, including commercial paper,
risky assets formerly held by Bear Stearns, and debt issued by
the government-sponsored housing enterprises Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. In a bankers’ acceptance–style program, the
assets held by these vehicles perhaps would be “accepted” by
the Federal Reserve and then sold to private-market investors.
If successful, so doing would simultaneously reduce banks’
excess balances at the Federal Reserve while “retraining” pri-
vate investors to hold debt issued by private borrowers. Both
results seem highly desirable. Eventually, as fears of counter-
party risk diminish and financial market conditions return
closer to normal, private sector borrowing and lending should
be expected to return to normal channels. Consider, as an
example, commercial paper. In the near term, commercial
paper currently funded by the Federal Reserve’s Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm) might be repack-
aged as bankers’ acceptances for sale to the private sector, with
the Federal Reserve Banks acting as “accepting” banks. In the
longer term, when the Federal Reserve guarantee is no longer
required, normal functioning of the commercial paper market
could resume. ￿
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